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I. Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ
The Swiss Constitution in force today was introduced as recently as the year 
2000. However, Switzerland’s Constitution has experienced a lengthy his-
tory of adaptation and revision. The first section of this chapter examines 
the history behind the Constitution (1.), before outlining key concepts which 
are encompassed in its text, like the concept of citizenship (2), the protection 
of fundamental rights (3.), the allocation of powers between the federation, 
the cantons and the communes (4.) and the allocation of powers between the 
three branches of government on the federal level (5.).
ᇳ. H؜ئاآإج ؔءؗ Oةؘإة؜ؘت
Until 1848, the ancient Swiss cantons together formed a rather loose con-
federation. The cantons themselves were sovereign states, tied together by 
treaties. A typical example of such a treaty was the Confederate Treaty of 
1815. This was an agreement between the cantons to define a Swiss confe-
deration, agreed by the cantons under pressure from the then predominant 
European powers during the reorganisation of Europe at the Congress of 
Vienna. Simultaneously, at this Congress, the other European states reco-
gnised the borders of the Swiss confederation and its neutrality. In 1847, a 
civil war broke out in which the (predominantly liberal) Protestant cantons 
fought against the (predominantly conservative) Catholic cantons. The con-
flict erupted after the Catholic cantons founded the Sonderbund (“separate 
alliance”); the Protestant cantons considered this alliance as violating the 
Confederate Treaty. The Protestant cantons prevailed, and the Sonderbund 
was dissolved.
In the aftermath of this civil war, the Switzerland we know today was 
founded. In 1848, the new Constitution was put into force, although various 
ơƞƹƿƺƹƾè ᅬ ƸƞiƹlǄ ƿƩƣ CƞƿƩƺliơ ƺƹƣƾ ǂƩiơƩ ƩƞƢ Ɵƣƣƹ ƢƣƤƣƞƿƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ ơiǁil 
ǂƞƽèᅬ ƺƽiƨiƹƞllǄ ƺƻƻƺƾƣƢ iƿƾ ơƺƹƿƣƹƿ ƞƾ ǂƣll ƞƾ ƿƩƣ ơƽƣƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞ ƹƣǂ ƤƣƢƣƽƞ-
tion. The new Constitution created a modern federal state, whereby enume-
rated policy areas fell under the competence of the federal level, leaving the 
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regulation of all other policy areas to the then 25 cantons. It strengthened 
democratic structures and fundamental rights. It also introduced the organi-
sational system of checks and balances on the federal level through the esta-
blishment of three separate branches of government: the Federal Assembly 
(the legislative branch), the Federal Council (the executive branch) and the 
Federal Supreme Court (the judicial branch). In part, the new Constitution 
was visibly inspired by the US Constitution and the achievements of the 
French revolution.1
In 1874, the Constitution of 1848 was subjected to a complete revision. A 
major novelty was the introduction of the optional legislative referendum; 
citizens could request a binding vote on federal acts which the parliament 
planned to enact. Further, it was this revision that established the Federal 
Supreme Court as a permanent court. The army was unified; no longer did 
each canton have its own army. New fundamental rights such as economic 
freedom and the right to free primary school education were introduced. 
Other rights were extended, such as the right of domicile. 
Between 1874 and 1999, the Constitution was revised many times. As this 
occurred, the competences of the federal level were gradually enhanced. 
Moreover, the elements of direct democracy became more pronounced: in 
1891, the right of the citizens to propose a revision of the Constitution was 
introduced. A further development was the creation of the 26th canton: in 
1978, the Canton of Jura was founded. And eventually, as late as 1971, women 
were granted full political rights in federal matters (although some cantons 
took longer to guarantee the same right).2
In 1999, the Constitution was again completely revised. The prime objective 
of this total overhaul was to update and improve the text, without making any 
substantial changes. The new text was put into force in 2000, after a majority 
of the people (59 % of those who voted) and a majority of the cantons (12 
cantons, two half- cantons) approved it.3 It contains all the elements which 
are typical of a federal state’s modern Constitution (short of providing for the 
constitutional review of federal acts):
1 e؛آؠؔئ F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/é؟ؘثؔءؘؗإ M؜ئ؜ؖ /N؜ؖ آ؟  ؘeöأأؘإت؜ؘء, Constitutional Law in Switzerland, 
2nd edition, Alphen aan den Rijn 2012, n. 13; hؔ؟اؘإ Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, The Swiss Constitution in a 
Comparative Context, 2nd ƣƢiƿiƺƹ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ. Gƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ, ƹ. ᇴ, ƹ. ᇴᇲ ƣƿ. ƾƣƼ.
2 See below, pp. 159.
3 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999, SR 101; see for an English 
ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/MᇺfJ- dᇵᇸᇻᄭ. 
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ᅬ eiƿlƣ ᇳ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᅬᇸ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ ƢƣƤiƹƣƾ ƿƩƣ Ƹƞiƹ Ƥƣƞƿǀƽƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ 
confederation. It provides a list of the 26 cantons, which, together with 
the people, form the confederation itself. It also sets out the aims of 
the Swiss confederation, in particular the objectives of protecting the 
rights and liberties of the people and safeguarding the independence 
and security of the country. This part also sets out the national lan-
ƨǀƞƨƣƾ ƺƤ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ƞƾ Ɵƣiƹƨ GƣƽƸƞƹ ᄬƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ lƞƹƨǀƞƨƣ ƺƤ ᇸᇵ.ᇷ % 
of the population), French (22.5 %), Italian (8 %) and Romansh (0.5 %). 
Finally, this Title highlights the importance of the rule of law.
 ᅱ eiƿlƣ ᇴ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇹᅬᇶᇳ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ liƾƿƾ ƿƩƣ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ 
that apply in Switzerland and defines the requirements for Swiss 
citizenship.
 ᅱ eiƿlƣ ᇵ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇶᇴᅬᇳᇵᇷ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ ƢiƾƿiƹƨǀiƾƩƣƾ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƻƣƿƣƹơƣƾ ƺƤ 
the federation from the competences of the cantons and communes, 
by enumerating the competences which the federal level possesses. It 
also defines the financial system, including the rules on taxation. This 
section is by far the most voluminous, encompassing 104 articles.
 ᅱ eiƿlƣ ᇶ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇵᇸᅬᇳᇶᇴ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ ƨƽƞƹƿƾ ƻƺliƿiơƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ iƹ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl 
matters. In particular, it grants the right to participate in elections to 
the National Council and in popular votes (initiatives and referenda), 
as well as the right to launch or sign popular initiatives and requests 
for referenda.
 ᅱ eiƿlƣ ᇷ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇶᇵᅬᇳᇻᇳơ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƺƽƨƞƹiƾƞƿiƺƹ 
and competences of the main federal authorities: namely, the Federal 
Assembly, the Federal Council and the federal administration, the 
Federal Supreme Court and the other judicial authorities.
ᅬ eiƿlƣ ᇸ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇻᇴᅬᇳᇻᇹ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ ƾƣƿƾ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺơƣƢǀƽƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƽƣ-
vision of the Constitution. One key requirement is that the people and 
the cantons must agree on any proposed revision. A revision can be 
initiated by the federal authorities or the people (popular initiative). 
Title 6 also contains transitional provisions.
In addition to the relevance of the Constitution itself, constitutional law 
and practice in Switzerland is influenced by international law, which often 
encompasses rules of constitutional relevance. A prime example of this is the 
influence of international human rights guarantees, as well as some of the 
bilateral agreements that Switzerland has concluded with the EU. Interpreting 
Swiss law, including the Constitution, in conformity with international law 
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is a well- established method of interpretation, supplementing the classical 
canon of methods of interpretation. However, although Switzerland as a 
country has traditionally taken a friendly, inclusive approach towards inter-
national law, the Constitution continues to follow the introverted tradition of 
constitutionalism and fails to properly reflect Switzerland’s participation in 
global and European organisations and treaty networks.4
ᇴ. aؘآأ؟ؘ
Switzerland has 8’400’000 inhabitants. 6’300’000 of these inhabitants are 
dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ. eƩƣ ƺƿƩƣƽƾèᅬ i.e. ᇴᇷ % ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƺƻǀlƞƿiƺƹèᅬ ƞƽƣ Ƥƺƽƣiƨƹ ƹƞƿiƺƹƞlƾ 
(not including asylum seekers); a very significant proportion. Moreover, more 
than 300’000 persons commute across the borders to and from Switzerland, 
often on a daily basis. 770’000 Swiss citizens live abroad.
ƞᄭ CiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ
Citizenship in Switzerland is based on the concept that a citizen has three 
citizenships: communal, cantonal, and Swiss (Article 37 Constitution). These 
citizenships are connected: in particular, cantonal and communal citizen-
ships are prerequisites of Swiss citizenship. It is permitted to have dual citi-
zenship under Swiss law, i.e. to possess Swiss citizenship in addition to the 
citizenship of another country.
Citizenship can be acquired by law or by naturalisation. The prerequisi-
tes for the acquisition are defined partly by federal law (which mainly just 
lƞǄƾ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ ƸiƹiƸǀƸ ƽƣƼǀiƽƣƸƣƹƿƾᄭ ƞƹƢ ƻƞƽƿlǄ ƟǄ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl lƞǂ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇺ 
Constitution). With respect to federal law, the Federal Act on Swiss Citizenship 
(Swiss Citizenship Act) is relevant:
ᅬ dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ iƾ ƞơƼǀiƽƣƢ ƟǄ lƞǂ, i.ƣ. ƞǀƿƺƸƞƿiơƞllǄ, ƟǄ ơƩil-
Ƣƽƣƹ ǂƩƺ Ʃƞǁƣ ƺƹƣ ƻƞƽƣƹƿ ǂiƿƩ dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇳ dǂiƾƾ 
Citizenship Act).5 These children also attain the Swiss parent’s can-
ƿƺƹƞl ƞƹƢ ơƺƸƸǀƹƞl ơiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇴ dǂiƾƾ CiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ éơƿᄭ. 
4 See the chapter on International Relations, pp. 163.
5 Federal Act on Swiss Citizenship of 20 June 2014 (Swiss Citizenship Act, SCA), SR 141.0; 
ƾƣƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ éơƿ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/
GHNᇷ- Hgᇸjᄭ. 
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Thereby, Switzerland follows the principle of ius sanguinis. A child 
who is adopted will also acquire Swiss citizenship, from the adopting 
dǂiƾƾ ƻƞƽƣƹƿ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇶ dǂiƾƾ CiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ éơƿᄭ.
ᅬ dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ iƾ ƞơƼǀiƽƣƢ ƟǄ ƹƞƿǀƽƞliƾƞƿiƺƹ, i.ƣ. ƟǄ ƞƹ ƺƤƤiơiƞl Ƣƣ-
cree, when an applicant fulfils the relevant requirements stipulated by 
ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞƹƢ ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl lƞǂ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾè ᇻᅬᇳᇻ dǂiƾƾ CiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ éơƿᄭ. hiƿƩ 
respect to federal law, the requirements are that an applicant must 
demonstrate that he or she has been successfully integrated into the 
Swiss society (requiring, inter alia, to respect the values of the Swiss 
Constitution and to be able to communicate in one of the national lan-
guages), is accustomed to the Swiss way of life and does not endanger 
the internal or external security of Switzerland, and that he or she has 
resided in Switzerland for a certain period of time (ten years for adults). 
For cantons to approve naturalisation, which is also necessary for Swiss 
citizenship, it is usually required that an applicant speaks one of the 
canton’s official languages and that he or she has resided in the canton 
and commune for a certain period of time (which shall not exceed five 
Ǆƣƞƽƾ ƞơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇺ dǂiƾƾ CiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ éơƿᄭ. Iƹ ǁƞƽiƺǀƾ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ, 
the decision to grant citizenship has traditionally been taken by com-
munal assemblies or, even more problematically in terms of affording 
sufficient respect to such individuals’ fundamental rights, by the elect-
orate in secret ballot votes.6 A simplified procedure for naturalisation 
applies to certain foreign nationals, in particular to spouses of Swiss 
citizens. In 2017, the people and the cantons voted in favour of a new 
constitutional provision which mandates that the federal authorities 
shall enact simplified regulations on the naturalisation of third gener-
ation immigrants (Article 38 III Constitution).
Swiss citizenship is the prerequisite for various rights and duties. On the 
federal level, the following are the most relevant:
ᅬ dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ ƺǁƣƽ ƿƩƣ ƞƨƣ ƺƤ ᇳᇺ ƣƹjƺǄ ƹǀƸƣƽƺǀƾ ƻƺliƿiơƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ. eƩƣǄ 
have the right to participate in elections to the National Council and in 
popular votes (initiatives and referenda) and to launch or sign initiatives 
and requests for referenda (Article 136 Constitution). Swiss citizens benefit 
from the freedom of domicile in Switzerland (Article 24 Constitution), 
6 See pp. 160.
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from the protection against expulsion, extradition and deportation 
(Article 25 Constitution) and from diplomatic protection abroad.
ᅬ dǂiƾƾ Ƹƣƹ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞ ƢǀƿǄ ƿƺ ƽƣƹƢƣƽ ƸiliƿƞƽǄ ƾƣƽǁiơƣ. Fƺƽ ǂƺƸƣƹ, ƸiliƿƞƽǄ 
service is possible but voluntary (Article 59 Constitution).
Swiss citizenship can be lost by law, i.e. automatically, or by official decree. 
It is lost by law, for instance, when a Swiss citizen was born and has lived 
abroad, possesses another citizenship and does not declare that he or she 
wants to maintain the Swiss citizenship by the time he or she reaches the 
ƞƨƣ ƺƤ ᇴᇸ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇹ dǂiƾƾ CiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ éơƿᄭ. Iƿ iƾ lƺƾƿ ƟǄ ƞƹ ƺƤƤiơiƞl Ƣƣơƽƣƣ, Ƥƺƽ 
instance, when a Swiss citizen who also possesses another citizenship seri-
ƺǀƾlǄ ǁiƺlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿƾ ƺƽ ƽƣƻǀƿƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇶᇴ dǂiƾƾ 
Citizenship Act). These rules are adherent to the international principle that 
statelessness shall be avoided.
Ɵᄭ Fƺƽƣiƨƹ Nƞƿiƺƹƞlƾ
As briefly mentioned above, Switzerland has traditionally been a country 
with a high percentage of people who live and work in the country but do not 
possess Swiss citizenship. Various factors might explain this. Firstly, the eco-
nomic prosperity of the country has led to a high demand for manpower from 
abroad. Moreover, the fact that EU citizens in Switzerland enjoy substantial 
rights based on the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons between 
Switzerland and the EU reduces the incentive for such people to be natura-
lised. Finally, the restrictive naturalisation policy in Switzerland means that 
even persons who have lived in the country for decades may not necessarily 
meet the requirements for naturalisation.
Article 121 Constitution confers the legislative competence for matters of 
immigration and asylum to the federal authorities. Based upon this conferral, 
the Federal Act on Foreigners regulates entry to, residence in and departure 
from the country.
Over the last few decades, various popular initiatives have aimed at for-
cing the federal authorities to implement a more restrictive policy vis- à- vis 
foreign nationals.7 For example, in 2010, the people and the cantons appro-
ved the initiative “for the expulsion of criminal foreign nationals” (“Für die 
Ausschaffung krimineller Ausländer”). This initiative stated that foreign nati-
ƺƹƞlƾ ǂƩƺ ơƺƸƸiƿ ƺƹƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƣƹǀƸƣƽƞƿƣƢ ơƽiƸƣƾèᅬ ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ ƩƺƸiơiƢƣ, ƽƞƻƣ 
7 See for popular initiatives in general pp. 151.
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ƞƹƢ ƽƺƟƟƣƽǄèᅬ ƺƽ ƣǁƣƹ ƿƩƺƾƣ ǂƩƺ Ʃƞǁƣ iƸƻƽƺƻƣƽlǄ ơlƞiƸƣƢ ƾƺơiƞl iƹƾǀƽƞƹơƣ 
or social assistance benefits will lose the right of residence automatically 
and must be deported (Article 121 III- VI Constitution). The Federal Assembly 
did not implement the initiative literally as such an implementation would 
have been incompatible with international law guarantees; in particular, it 
iƹơlǀƢƣƢ ƞ ƩƞƽƢƾƩiƻ ơlƞǀƾƣèᅬ ƞ ơlƞǀƾƣ ǂƩiơƩ ƞllƺǂƾ Ƥƺƽ ƤlƣǃiƟiliƿǄ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƞƻƻliƣƢ 
when the expulsion would result in a severe personal hardship and the pri-
vate interests of the foreign national to stay in Switzerland prevail over the 
public interests to expulse him or her. In response to this legislation, another 
popular initiative was launched; it was entitled “enforcing the expulsion of 
criminal foreign nationals” (“Zur Durchsetzung der Ausschaffung krimineller 
Ausländer”) and demanded a strict implementation of the original initiative. 
However, the people and the cantons rejected this call for strict implementa-
tion in 2016. Another popular initiative dealing with immigration was enti-
ƿlƣƢ “ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ Ƹƞƾƾ iƸƸiƨƽƞƿiƺƹ” ᄬ“Gƣƨƣƹ MƞƾƾƣƹƣiƹǂƞƹƢƣƽǀƹƨ”ᄭ ƞƹƢ ǂƞƾ 
approved by the people and cantons in 2014. This initiative stipulates that 
Switzerland shall control the immigration of foreign nationals autonomously, 
by introducing annual quotas and granting Swiss citizens priority on the 
job market (Articles 121a ƞƹƢ ᇳᇻᇹ Nƺèᇳᇳ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. eƩƣƾƣ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ, ƽƣƞƢ 
together, are obviously directed against the Agreement on the Free Movement 
of Persons between the EU and Switzerland, although they do not explicitly 
refer to this agreement, let alone mandate the government to terminate it. 
The Federal Assembly decided to implement the initiative in a way that ensu-
red it would not violate the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons.8
Foreign nationals do not enjoy political rights on the federal level. This is 
ƻƽƺƟlƣƸƞƿiơ, Ɵƣơƞǀƾƣ ƿƩƣƾƣ ƻƣƺƻlƣèᅬ ᇴᇷ % ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƺƻǀlƞƿiƺƹ, ƻƞǄiƹƨ ƿƞǃƣƾ ƞƾ 
dǂiƾƾ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ Ƣƺèᅬ ƞƽƣ ƩƣƹơƣƤƺƽƿƩ ƣǃơlǀƢƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƸƺơƽƞƿiơ ƻƽƺơƣƾƾ. Iƿ 
should be noted, however, that some cantons and communes do grant politi-
cal rights to foreign nationals. For example, the cantons of Jura and Neuchâtel 
grant foreign nationals, under certain conditions, the right to vote at cantonal 
and communal levels.
8 See the chapter on International Relations, p. 177.
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ᇵ. Fبءؗؔؠؘءاؔ؟ c؜ؚ؛ائ
The Constitution contains an impressive catalogue of fundamental rights, 
starting with human dignity and followed by all the rights which are usually 
found in modern European constitutions: equality before the law; the prohi-
bition of discrimination on the grounds of, inter alia, origin, race, gender and 
age; the protection against arbitrariness; protection of good faith; civil liber-
ties and freedoms; political rights; basic procedural rights and basic social 
ƽiƨƩƿƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇹᅬᇵᇶ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ.
Article 35 Constitution mandates that fundamental rights must be respec-
ted throughout the entire legal system. Individuals can invoke them against 
state authorities. Further, private persons are bound by fundamental rights 
when they exercise a state function. Finally, fundamental rights must be taken 
into account by the state, where appropriate, in regulating relation ships bet-
ween individuals. This includes the obligation to draft new laws, and interpret 
existing laws, in light of fundamental rights (so- called indirect third- party 
effect). For instance, marriage and family law is to be shaped and interpreted 
in light of the right to marry and to have a family (Article 14 Constitution). 
Article 36 Constitution makes it clear that guaranteed rights do not apply in 
an absolute manner. Restrictions are lawful as long as they fulfil all of the fol-
lowing conditions: they have a legal basis, are justified by a public interest, are 
proportionate and do not violate the essence of the right in question.
In addition to the federal Constitution, fundamental rights are guaranteed 
in cantonal constitutions and in international treaties:
ᅬ eƩƣ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ ƞlƾƺ ơƺƹƿƞiƹ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƽiƨƩƿƾ. 
In some cases, they go beyond what is guaranteed by the federal 
Constitution. For instance, the Constitution of the Canton of Zurich 
guarantees, in Article 15, the right to found, to organise and to attend 
private educational institutions.
ᅬ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ƿƽƣƞƿiƣƾ ƞƽƣ ƩiƨƩlǄ ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ƺƤ Ƥǀƹ-
damental rights in Switzerland. First and foremost, the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has been attributed a quasi- 
constitutional status by the Federal Supreme Court.9 Other inter-
national treaties complement the protection guaranteed by the ECHR, 
such as the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
9 BGE ᇳᇳᇹ IƟ ᇵᇸᇹ.
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the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Moreover, the 
comparative law method of interpretation has traditionally been in-
strumental in further developing fundamental rights in Switzerland; 
iƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ, lƞǂ ƞƹƢ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣ iƹ GƣƽƸƞƹǄ, ƿƩƣ fƹiƿƣƢ dƿƞƿƣƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ 
EU has markedly influenced developments in the protection of funda-
mental rights in Switzerland.
The Federal Supreme Court has not hesitated to recognise fundamen-
tal rights which were not explicitly provided for in the Constitution of 1848 
or 1874, thereby recognising the existence and enforceability of unwritten 
rights. Examples include freedom of expression (now Article 16 Constitution), 
freedom of assembly (now Article 22 Constitution) and the right to assistance 
when in need (now Article 12 Constitution).10 It is conceivable that in the 
future the Federal Supreme Court might again recognise guarantees which 
are not (yet) enshrined in the Constitution, if such a step appears prudent in 
light of new challenges and threats.
Individuals can directly invoke fundamental rights which are guaranteed 
by the federal Constitution before administrative authorities and courts. For 
example, this can be done in cases where cantonal laws and decisions are 
being reviewed. Similarly, it is possible to challenge decisions based on federal 
ordinances as to their compatibility with fundamental rights. However, the 
limit to this review comes in the form of Article 190 Constitution, which 
mandates that the Federal Supreme Court and the other judicial authorities 
apply federal acts and international law. This precludes any possibility for the 
courts to declare federal acts invalid if they are shown to be incompatible 
with fundamental rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution.11
ᇶ. Fؘؘؗإؔا؜آء, Cؔءاآءئ, Cآؠؠبءؘئ
Federalism is a basic constitutional principle in Switzerland. The competences 
and responsibilities are vertically distributed over the three levels of govern-
ment, namely the federation, the cantons and the communes (municipalities). 
10 BGE ᇺᇹ I ᇳᇳᇶ; BGE ᇻᇸ I ᇴᇳᇻ; BGE ᇳᇴᇳ I ᇵᇸᇹ.
11 See pp. 156.
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The latter enjoy considerable autonomy in regulating their own affairs, pro-
fiting from the principle of subsidiarity (Article 5a Constitution), which dic-
tates that the Confederation only interferes with regulation if the cantons or 
communes are unable to regulate a particular matter themselves. It is partly 
thanks to this arrangement that the identity- creating societal, linguistic and 
cultural diversity throughout the country is preserved. The people are also 
encouraged to actively participate in political debates and decision- making 
on the cantonal and communal level. Further, the federal bicameral parlia-
mentary system ensures that the cantons participate in the law- making pro-
cess on the federal level.12 They are also involved in the process of revising the 
federal Constitution; a revision must not only be approved of by a majority of 
the people but also by a majority of the cantons. 
Overall, the above arrangements ensure that the Swiss federal system 
displays a unique “bottom- up” character.13 Simultaneously, however, it is 
acknowledged that the federal level and the cantons shall cooperate and 
support each other in the fulfilment of their duties (Article 44 Constitution). 
An essential element in achieving this goal is the use of national equali-
sation payments, both between the individual cantons and between the 
federation and the cantons. These payments contribute to the promotion 
of internal cohesion (Article 2 II Constitution). In 2017, they amounted to 
ƞlƸƺƾƿ CHF ᇷèƟilliƺƹ.14
The following paragraphs describe characteristic features of the three levels 
of government:
ᅬ eƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ iƾ ơƺƸƻƺƾƣƢ ƺƤ ƟƺƿƩ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƺƻlƣ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹƿƺƹƾ 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇳ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. eƩƣ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl lƣǁƣl ƣƹjƺǄƾ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƻƣƿƣƹơƣƾ 
which are assigned to it by the Constitution (Article 42 Constitution). 
eƩƣǄ ƞƽƣ ƣƹǀƸƣƽƞƿƣƢ lƞƽƨƣlǄ iƹ éƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇷᇶᅬᇳᇴᇷ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ. FƣƢƣƽƞl 
law takes precedence over cantonal and communal law (Article 49 
Constitution). This remains the case even where the Federal Assembly 
passes acts which, according to the Constitution, are not within its 
competence.15
12 See pp. 148.
13 Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 92; s. also F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/M؜ئ؜ؖ/eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, n. 289.
14 Federal Department of Finance, Factsheet: National Fiscal Equalization (NFA), 2017 
ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/jJEᇴ- dGEᇷᄭ.
15 See pp. 156 for the lack of constitutional review of federal acts.
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 ᅱ The second level of government is formed by the 26 Cantons (23 can-
tons, six half- cantons).16 As mentioned, it was the Canton of Jura that 
became the 26th canton in 1978; its territory had formerly been part of 
the Canton of Bern. Attempts to merge the two half- cantons of Basel 
Stadt and Basel Landschaft into one canton have been unsuccessful; 
in 2014, the people of Basel Stadt voted strongly in favour of such a 
merger, but the people of Basel Landschaft strongly rejected it. Zurich 
is the canton with the biggest population, with 1’460’000 inhabitants, 
while the Canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden is the smallest, counting 
just 16’000 inhabitants. Despite differences in size and population, all 
cantons are equal in respect of their legal status, with the exception 
that half- cantons have only one seat in the Council of Cantons (Article 
150 Constitution) and count only as half a canton when a majority of 
the cantons is required for a revision of the Constitution (Article 142 
Constitution). The cantons possess all competences which have not 
been assigned to the federal level (Articles 3 and 42 Constitution), in-
cluding the implementation of federal law (Article 46 Constitution). 
They enjoy considerable autonomy in organising themselves and regu-
lating their own affairs; the federal level ensures that the cantons 
have sufficient financial resources to do so (Article 47 Constitution). 
Cantons are also able to conclude inter- cantonal agreements between 
themselves (Article 48 Constitution).17
ᅬ eƩƣ ƿƩiƽƢ lƣǁƣl ƺƤ ƨƺǁƣƽƹƸƣƹƿ iƾ ƸƞƢƣ ǀƻ ƺƤ ƾƺƸƣ ᇴ’ᇴᇻᇲ ơƺƸƸǀƹƣƾ. eƩƣ 
number is declining due to an ongoing trend where communes merge 
in order to carry out tasks more efficiently. As with cantons, the popula-
tion and size of the communes differs greatly. The Commune of Zurich 
is the biggest, counting almost 400’000 inhabitants; the Commune of 
Bister (Canton of Valais) is the smallest, counting only 31 inhabitants. 
The autonomy of the communes is explicitly guaranteed, although the 
scope of this autonomy is ultimately determined by the cantons (Article 
50 Constitution). Within the limits of their autonomy, the communes 
ƺƽƨƞƹiƾƣ Ƣƣơiƾiƺƹ- Ƹƞkiƹƨ iƹ ơƺƸƸǀƹƞl Ƹƞƿƿƣƽƾèᅬ ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ lƺơƞl ƿƞǃƣƾ, 
lƺơƞl ƻƺliơƣ, ƻƽiƸƞƽǄ ƣƢǀơƞƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƻlƞƹƹiƹƨ ƺƤ lƞƹƢ ǀƾƣèᅬ ƿƩƣƸƾƣlǁƣƾ.
16 The six half- cantons are Appenzell Ausserrhoden and Appenzell Innerrhoden; Basel 
Stadt and Basel Landschaft; and Obwalden and Nidwalden. They are known as “half- 
cantons” because they originated from internal divisions in three cantons; Appenzell, 
Basel and Unterwalden.
17 See, for example, the chapter on Criminal Procedure, p. 399.
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Over the last few decades, the federal system has increasingly come under 
pressure in various ways. First, there has been an ongoing shift of competen-
ces from the cantons to the federal level, resulting in an increased burden of 
responsibilities for the federation.18 Second, the increasing tendency to take 
recourse to international treaties often results in a tacit neutralisation of can-
tonal competences. Various bilateral agreements with the EU are examples 
of this, such as the harmonisation of the mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications based on the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons. 
Accordingly, consultation and cooperation between the different layers of 
government is even more important today than in the past, in order to ensure 
that the cantons can have some influence over the conclusion of treaties which 
may affect their powers. Third, the principle that all cantons have an equal 
standing in votes on the revision of the Constitution does not quite fit with the 
principle that all Swiss citizens are equal and have only one vote. A citizen of 
the Canton of Uri possesses a voting power which is 35 times weightier than 
the voting power of a citizen of the Canton of Zurich. As problematic as it might 
be, this inequality is an inevitable consequence of the deliberate choice to cre-
ate Switzerland as a federation, consisting of both the people and the cantons.
ᇷ. Fؘؘؗإؔ؟ Aئئؘؠؕ؟ج, Fؘؘؗإؔ؟ Cآبءؖ؜؟, Fؘؘؗإؔ؟ 
Cآبإائ
The federal level is organised in order to guarantee the classic principle of the 
separation of powers between the different branches of government (checks 
and balances). The composition and functions of the Federal Assembly, the 
Federal Council (including the federal administration), and the Federal 
Supreme Court and other federal judicial authorities are as follows:19
ᅬ eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl éƾƾƣƸƟlǄ iƾ ƿƩƣ lƣƨiƾlƞƿǀƽƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇶᇺᅬᇳᇹᇵ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. 
It is a bicameral parliament, consisting of the National Council and the 
Council of States. The National Council has 200 members, representing 
the people. The seats are allocated to the cantons in proportion to their 
18 Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 65.
19 See for two particularities, namely the right of the people to have the last word on federal 
acts and international treaties and the Federal Council’s organisation as a multi- party 
collegiate body, pp. 151 and pp. 155.
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population. Currently, the Canton of Zurich has 35 seats, while six can-
tons, including the Canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden, to name but one, 
have the minimum of one seat. In each canton, the elections operate 
through the system of proportional representation. The Council of States 
consists of 46 members, i.e. two delegates from each canton (whereby 
half- cantons delegate one person), whose role is to represent their can-
tons. The election of the cantonal delegates is governed by cantonal law; 
in most cantons, majority voting applies. The term of office for both 
chambers is four years; re- elections are possible. The two chambers are 
equal and have similar powers. In particular, both chambers must agree 
on the enactment of federal acts and the conclusion of international 
treaties, as well as on the proposed budget. The members of both cham-
bers act together, as the United Federal Assembly, when they elect the 
members of the Federal Council, the members of the Federal Supreme 
Court and, in times of war, the Commander- in- Chief of the armed forces.
 ᅱ The Federal Council is the highest governing and executive authority 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇹᇶᅬᇳᇺᇹ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. Iƿ ơƺƹƾiƾƿƾ ƺƤ ƾƣǁƣƹ ƸƣƸƟƣƽƾ ᄬơƺǀƹ-
cillors) who are elected individually by the Federal Assembly for a 
term of four years. In 2013, the people and the cantons rejected the 
initiative “popular election of the Federal Council” (“Volkswahl des 
Bundesrates”) which tried to demand that councillors be elected 
directly by the people. Re- elections are possible and usually occur 
as a matter of routine; there have only been four instances in which 
councillors have not been re- elected since 1848.20 The various geo-
graphical and linguistic regions of the country should be appro-
priately represented, which usually is the case. Moreover, all major 
political parties are represented, based on a tacit agreement between 
the major parties.21 One of the councillors acts as “President of the 
Confederation”, chairing Federal Council meetings and fulfilling rep-
resentation duties in the country and abroad for a term of one year, 
acting as primus or prima inter pares (first among equals). The Federal 
Council takes its decisions as a collective body, endorsing the prin-
ciple of collegiality. It directs the federal administration whereby 
each councillor heads one of the seven Departments (Department of 
Foreign Affairs; Department of Home Affairs; Department of Justice 
20 Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 300.
21 See pp. 155.
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and Police; Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport; 
Department of Finance; Department of Economic Affairs, Education 
and Research; Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and 
Communications). The Federal Council decides on the objectives of 
government policy, thereby deploying political leadership. It submits 
drafts of federal acts to the Federal Assembly, enacts ordinances and is 
responsible for foreign relations.
ᅬ eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ iƾ ƿƩƣ ƾǀƻƽƣƸƣ jǀƢiơiƞl ƞǀƿƩƺƽiƿǄ ƺƤ 
dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇺᇺᅬᇳᇻᇳc Constitution). Currently, it consists of 38 
full- time judges and 19 part- times judges. They are elected by the United 
Federal Assembly for a term of six years; re- election is possible and, 
if attempted, is regularly achieved. The court is divided up into seven 
divisions: two divisions of public law, two divisions of social security 
law, two divisions of private law, and one division of criminal law. It acts 
upon appeal, hearing cases which have been decided either by the high-
est cantonal courts or by other federal courts, i.e. the Federal Criminal 
Court, the Federal Administrative Court and the Federal Patent Court.22 
The independence of the courts is constitutionally guaranteed.
The members of the Federal Assembly, the Federal Council and the Federal 
Supreme Court are generally members of political parties. In the Federal 
Assembly, the most powerful parties are the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) with 
70 seats, the Social Democratic Party (SPS) with 56 seats, the Liberals (FDP) 
with 45 seats and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (CVP) with 40 
seats. These four parties are also represented in the Federal Council.23 The 
federal judges are also elected on the basis of party membership. The combi-
nation of the judges’ party membership with the relatively short term of office 
of six years for federal judges means that they are under more scrutiny than 
judges in other jurisdictions, where judges may have longer terms of office but 
no possibility of facing periodic re- elections.
The city of Bern is the capital of Switzerland. This city is home to numerous 
official activities: the Federal Assembly meets here, and the official seat of the 
Federal Council and the departments is also in Bern. The Federal Supreme 
Court is located in Lausanne, while its two social security law divisions are 
located in the city of Lucerne.
22 See pp. 156 for the limited extent of constitutional review in Switzerland.
23 See pp. 151.
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II. aƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ
The Swiss political system is characterised by various particularities which 
distinguish it from theoretical models of political systems and from those 
systems which exist in other states. The following particularities are most 
noteworthy.
ᇳ. ᄬdؘؠ؜- ᄭ D؜إؘؖا Dؘؠآؖإؔؖج
Swiss citizens are regularly called upon to vote on specific political issues. 
Their decisions are legally binding and cannot be overturned or ignored by 
state authorities. On the federal level, popular initiatives and referenda are 
the relevant instruments. Accordingly, the Swiss system is often termed a 
semi- direct democracy, mixing elements of a representative system with 
strong direct democratic elements.24 In addition, the cantons and communes 
are free to set up their own systems and methods which operate to facilitate 
the direct participation of the people.
ƞᄭ aƺƻǀlƞƽ Iƹiƿiƞƿiǁƣ
A popular initiative is an instrument unique to Switzerland: it allows citi-
ǅƣƹƾ ƿƺ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿ ƞ ǁƺƿƣ ƺƹ ƞ ƽƣǁiƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇵᇺᅬᇳᇵᇻb 
Constitution). It requires the approval of a majority of the people who vote 
and a majority of the cantons in order to be successful.
The right to launch a popular initiative was introduced in 1891. When it was 
first introduced, 50’000 citizens were required to sign an initiative in order for 
it to be put to the vote of the people and the cantons. Since then, some limit-
ations have been added: in 1976, the time period within which the required 
amount of signatures must be collected was circumscribed to 18 months. In 
1977, i.e. shortly after women’s suffrage had been introduced (as mentioned, 
24 See for the societal preconditions upon which the Swiss model of direct democracy 
depends the chapter on Legal Sociology, pp. 118.
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this was not until 1971), the number of signatures was raised to 100’000. The 
Constitution leaves it to the drafters of an initiative to decide whether to pro-
pose a revision in general terms or to submit a specific draft of a provision or 
several provisions. In practice, specific drafts are the norm. The authors of 
an initiative are free to choose an appropriate title, as long as it is not mislea-
ding. Accordingly, authors tend to label initiatives with lurid titles in order to 
sell them on the political market. An illustrative example was the initiative 
“against rip- off” (“gegen die Abzockerei”) in 2013 which was approved by the 
people and the cantons.
The Constitution does not set any hurdles for proposing new provisions, 
except that peremptory norms of international law must not be violated (ius 
cogens) and, in the case of a proposal for a partial revision, that the principle 
of unity of form and subject- matter is respected (Article 139 III Constitution). 
One example of an initiative which did not meet the former requirement was 
the initiative entitled “enforcing the expulsion of criminal foreign nationals” 
(“Zur Durchsetzung der Ausschaffung krimineller Ausländer”) of 2016, which 
demanded a strict implementation of the original initiative of 2010.25 This 
initiative was declared partially invalid by the Federal Assembly; although 
it acknowledged the supremacy of ius cogens over the proposed provisions, 
it defined ius cogens exhaustively, rather than leaving it to the international 
community to further develop this concept and include new elements over 
time.
Traditionally, popular initiatives have been launched by minorities on 
issues the established political parties do not want to take up in parliament. In 
recent years, political parties have increasingly begun to take recourse to ini-
tiatives themselves, by- passing the classic parliamentary process. Moreover, 
initiatives can be launched by interest groups to bring a specific concern to 
the attention of the public, thereby exerting pressure on the political parties 
to address the issue. The constitution provides for the possibility that the 
Federal Assembly submits a counter- proposal to an initiative; when this is the 
case, the committee responsible for the initiative can withdraw it, and only 
ƿƩƣ ơƺǀƹƿƣƽ- ƻƽƺƻƺƾƞlèᅬ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ ƿƺ Ɵƣ Ƹƺƽƣ likƣlǄ ƿƺ Ƹƣƣƿ ƞƻƻƽƺǁƞlèᅬ iƾ ƾǀƟ-
mitted to the vote of the people and the cantons. The Federal Assembly might 
also begin efforts to enact a federal act which encompasses the objectives of 
the initiative (indirect counter- proposal); again, in this case, the committee 
who launched the initiative might withdraw it.
25 Previously discussed in the section on Foreign Nationals, pp. 142.
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The people and the cantons have become more willing to approve popular 
initiatives over the last fifteen years or so. Out of the 22 initiatives which were 
approved since the creation of this instrument in 1871, ten were approved of 
after 2002. Amongst these were various initiatives which were incompatible 
with international law. This is problematic.26
Ɵᄭ cƣƤƣƽƣƹƢǀƸ
A referendum allows citizens to vote on a constitutional revision, a federal 
ƞơƿ ƺƽ ƞƹ iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl ƿƽƣƞƿǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇶᇲᅬᇳᇶᇴ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. eǂƺ ƿǄƻƣƾ ƞƽƣ 
provided for:
ᅬ é ƸƞƹƢƞƿƺƽǄ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹƢǀƸ: ƿƩiƾ ƿƞkƣƾ ƻlƞơƣƾ ƞǀƿƺƸƞƿiơƞllǄ, i.ƣ. ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ 
the need for any action from the authorities or the people, in the case of 
constitutional revisions initiated by the Federal Assembly, accessions 
to organisations for collective security (e.g. NATO) or to supranational 
communities (e.g. the EU) and in the case of emergency acts not based 
on a constitutional provision. Such referenda require the approval of 
the majority of the people who vote and the majority of the cantons in 
order to be successful.
ᅬ éƹ ƺƻƿiƺƹƞl ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹƢǀƸ: ƿƩiƾ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ƽƣƼǀƣƾƿƣƢ ƟǄ ᇷᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ 
against, in particular, the enactment of a federal act (introduced in 
1874) and the conclusion of an international treaty which is of unlim-
ited duration and cannot be terminated, provides for accession to an 
international organisation, or contains important legislative provi-
sions or requires the enactment of federal legislation for implemen-
tation (introduced in 1921, extended in 1977 and 2003). Originally, the 
necessary number of signatures was 30’000. In 1977, the number was 
increased to 50’000. The signatures must be collected within 100 days 
of the official publication of the act or treaty. The people’s vote is de-
cisive for the outcome of such a referendum; it is not necessary that a 
majority of the cantons also approve or reject the act or treaty.
Since 1874, there have been 183 cases where optional referenda have been 
held, after citizens have successfully collected the necessary number of signa-
tures. In 79 votes, the people agreed to put in force the act or treaty in ques-
tion; a prominent and to some extent controversial example was the approval 
26 See the chapter on International Relations, pp. 177.
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in 2002 of an act which legalised abortions during the first 12 weeks of preg-
ƹƞƹơǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇳᇻ dǂiƾƾ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣᄭ. Iƹ ᇳᇲᇶ ǁƺƿƣƾ, ƿƩƣ ƺǀƿơƺƸƣ ǂƞƾ ƹƣƨƞ-
tive, and the act or treaty was not put into force as originally envisaged by the 
Federal Assembly: a prominent example was the rejection of the Federal Act 
on the 2020 Pensions Reform in 2017.
The existence of the referendum in Switzerland modifies the representa-
tive system. It is the main instrument of control of, and opposition against, 
the Federal Assembly. To some extent, providing for the possibility to launch 
an optional referendum compensates for the lack of a fully- f ledged parlia-
mentary opposition.27 The Federal Assembly creates legislation which takes 
into account the concerns of as many political parties and stakeholders as 
possible, thus enhancing the chance that the final product will “survive” a 
possible referendum. Effectively, the citizens of Switzerland themselves 
become a key opposition to the Federal Assembly. Considering all of this, it 
becomes clear why the Swiss “referendum democracy” is often referred to as 
“consensus- oriented democracy”.28
ơᄭ “LƞƹƢƾƨƣƸƣiƹƢƣ” ƞƾ Cƞƹƿƺƹƞl aƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽiƿǄ
The cantons choose their own models for the participation of their citizens in 
the political process. A particularity is provided for in the cantons of Appenzell 
IƹƹƣƽƽƩƺƢƣƹ ƞƹƢ Glƞƽǀƾ, ǂƩiơƩ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞƻƻƺiƹƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ LƞƹƢƾƨƣƸƣiƹƢƣ ƞƾ ƿƩƣiƽ 
main decision- making body. Once a year, the cantonal citizens eligible to vote 
gather on the main town square in the respective capitals, Appenzell and 
Glƞƽǀƾ, ƞƹƢ ƢƣơiƢƣ ƺƹ ƞll ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ Ƹƞƿƿƣƽƾ, iƹơlǀƢiƹƨ ƞƹǄ ƽƣǁiƾiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƞƹ-
tonal Constitutions, the enactment of cantonal laws and issues surrounding 
elections. Pending issues are openly debated. Votes and elections are held in 
public; the method of voting is the raising of hands. Usually, the votes are 
estimated by the chairman or chairwoman. Votes are only actually counted 
individually in exceptional cases.
From a legal viewpoint, the Landsgemeinde presents various issues. Open 
voting conflicts with the right to submit a secret vote (Article 34 Constitution). 
Ciƿiǅƣƹƾ ǂƩƺ ƞƽƣ ǀƹƞƟlƣ ƿƺ ƞƿƿƣƹƢè ᅬ ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ ƣlƢƣƽlǄ ƺƽ ill ƻƣƺƻlƣ ƺƽ ƻƣƺƻlƣ 
ǂiƿƩ ƻƽƺƤƣƾƾiƺƹƞl ơƺƸƸiƿƸƣƹƿƾèᅬ ƞƽƣ ƣǃơlǀƢƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ ƣǃƣƽơiƾiƹƨ ƿƩƣiƽ ƻƺliƿiơƞl 
rights. This is problematic. Still, the Federal Supreme Court held that these 
27 Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 7.
28 aؔاإ؜ؖ؜ؔ Eؚ؟؜, IƹƿƽƺƢǀơƿiƺƹ ƿƺ dǂiƾƾ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl Lƞǂ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ. Gƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇸ, ƻ. ᇸᇶ; 
F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/M؜ئ؜ؖ/eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, n. 26, 98; Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 227.
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restrictions do not amount to a violation of the federal Constitution, “in spite 
of deficiencies inherent in the system”.29
ᇴ. Mب؟ا؜- aؔإاج Gآةؘإءؠؘءا
Most European countries adhere to a parliamentary system of govern-
ment, whereby the prime minister and his or her government depend on 
Parliament’s support.30 The strongest party selects the prime minister and 
forms the government, occasionally together with other parties as a coalition, 
if this is necessary to form a majority.
In Switzerland, a substantially different approach has developed over time. 
During the first decades of the confederation’s existence, the Federal Council 
was composed only of members of the Liberals (FDP). Towards the end of the 
19th century, in the aftermath of the introduction of the referendum and the 
popular initiative for a partial revision of the Constitution, the pressure to 
include members of other political parties grew. Therefore, in 1891, the first 
member of the Christian Democratic People’s Party (CVP) was elected to the 
Federal Council. In 1929, the first member of the Party of Farmers, Traders and 
IƹƢƣƻƣƹƢƣƹƿƾ ᄬBGBᄭ, ǂƩiơƩ ǂƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣƢƣơƣƾƾƺƽ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ aƣƺƻlƣ’ƾ aƞƽƿǄ 
(SVP), became councillor. In 1943, the Social Democratic Party (SPS) was repre-
sented in the Federal Council for the first time. Since then, it has been a Swiss 
particularity that all major political parties are represented in the Federal 
Council. To this effect, in 1959, the so- called “magic formula” was firmly esta-
blished in Switzerland. According to this formula, the Federal Council should 
consist of two members of the Liberals (FDP), the Social Democratic Party 
(SPS) and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (CVP) and of one member 
of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP). The distribution reflected, approximately, 
the number of seats which the parties usually won in the general elections. 
In 2003, the formula was slightly modified to reflect changes in the parties’ 
popularity. The Swiss People’s Party (SVP) gained one seat; they now have two 
members in the Federal Council.31 They gained their extra seat at the detri-
ment of the Christian Democratic People’s Party (CVP) which has only had 
29 BGE ᇳᇴᇳ I ᇳᇵᇺ.
30 Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 238 et seq.
31 This was partly interrupted between 2007 and 2015 when elected members of the SVP 
chose to leave the party and join a newly founded party, the Conservative Democratic 
Party (BDP).
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one seat since then. Both the Liberals (FDP) and the Social Democratic Party 
(SPS) still have two seats each.
The magic formula reflects a tacit agreement between the major parties 
that a collegiate system of a multi- party government best suits the interests 
ƺƤ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ. Iƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ, ƿƩiƾ ƻƽƞơƿiơƣèᅬ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƸƣƸƟƣƽƾ ƺƤ ƞll Ƹƞjƺƽ ƻƞƽ-
ƿiƣƾ ơƞƹ iƹƤlǀƣƹơƣ ƿƩƣ ƢƽƞƤƿiƹƨ ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ ǁƣƽǄ ƾƿƞƽƿèᅬ ƣƹƾǀƽƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl 
Council prepares legislative drafts in a way that they both achieve a majority 
in the Federal Assembly and also would be likely to “survive” a possible refe-
rendum. The collegiate system of a multi- party government is an essential 
part of the Swiss “concordance democracy”32.
However, there is no legal obligation on the part of the Federal Assembly 
to elect councillors according to the magic formula. As such, with each elec-
tion of a new councillor, the pros and cons of the Swiss model are discussed, 
and the public watches the resulting commotion in the Federal Palace with 
fascination. Nevertheless, despite the recurring debate, it seems likely that 
the magic formula will continue to form the basis for the composition of the 
Federal Council, although perhaps this composition will more readily adapt 
to actual developments than was the case in the previous decades.33
ᇵ. L؜ؠ؜اؘؗ Cآءئا؜ابا؜آءؔ؟ cؘة؜ؘت
Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹƞl ƽƣǁiƣǂèᅬ i.ƣ. ơƺǀƽƿ ƽƣǁiƣǂ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƸƻƞƿiƟiliƿǄ ƺƤ lƣƨƞl ƞơƿƾ ƞƹƢ 
decisions with the Constitution and their power to declare such acts invalid 
iƤ ƿƩƣǄ ƞƽƣ iƹơƺƸƻƞƿiƟlƣèᅬ iƾ ƞ ơƩƞƽƞơƿƣƽiƾƿiơ ƺƤ Ƹƺƾƿ Eǀƽƺƻƣƞƹ lƣƨƞl ƾǄƾƿƣƸƾ. 
In Switzerland, however, none of the courts are equipped with this function, 
at least with respect to federal acts. This is due to Article 190 Constitution, 
which mandates that the Federal Supreme Court and the other judicial autho-
rities apply the federal acts and international law. Therefore, the courts are 
obliged to apply federal acts even if they are found to violate the Constitution. 
In essence, it is the Federal Assembly which authoritatively interprets 
the Constitution during the process of enacting federal acts. This includes 
making an assessment as to whether federal acts are compatible with funda-
mental rights and whether the Federal Assembly is actually empowered by 
the Constitution to enact legislation in a specific policy field. This particular 
32 Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 227; Eؚ؟؜, p. 95.
33 See also F؟ؘ؜ءؘإ/M؜ئ؜ؖ/eöأأؘإت؜ؘء, n. 210.
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allocation of competence and responsibility is based on a deliberate systemic 
choice, approved of by the people and the cantons. Attempts to introduce the 
right of the judiciary to hear cases on the constitutionality of federal acts, for 
instance by simply deleting Article 190 Constitution, have repeatedly failed to 
gain enough political support.
Thus, the Federal Assembly becomes the final interpreter of the Constitution. 
The problematic aspects of this system are clear; the Federal Assembly is not 
ideally suited, for example, to guarantee fundamental rights, acting as it does 
through majority voting. However, the Federal Assembly is at least well placed 
to take its role as final interpreter of the Constitution seriously: it benefits 
from the advice and assistance of the Federal Council and the legal specialists 
in the federal administration who prepare drafts and assist in the decision- 
making process. Notably, it is not easy to point to federal acts which evidently 
violate the Constitution. Further, the following aspects of the case law of the 
Federal Supreme Court contribute to minimising the deficiencies of the cur-
rent system specifically with respect to the protection of fundamental rights:
ᅬ eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ơƺƹƾiƾƿƣƹƿlǄ iƹƿƣƽƻƽƣƿƾ ƤƣƢƣƽƞl ƞơƿƾ iƹ liƨƩƿ 
of fundamental rights, thereby adhering to the method of interpreting 
the law in conformity with the Constitution.34
 ᅱ The Federal Supreme Court does not refrain from pointing to existing 
incompatibilities if it is not possible to interpret federal acts in con-
formity with fundamental rights.35 By doing so, the Federal Supreme 
Court calls upon the Federal Assembly to remedy the identified defi-
ciencies; it is a method through which the Federal Supreme Court can 
press the Federal Assembly to at least discuss the issue.
ᅬ eƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƞơơƣƻƿƾ ơƞƾƣƾ iƹ ǂƩiơƩ iƿ iƾ ơƞllƣƢ ǀƻƺƹ ƿƺ 
review federal acts in light of the ECHR.36 The possibility for citizens 
to directly invoke the rights under this Convention before the Federal 
Supreme Court somewhat compensates for the lack of constitutional 
review of federal acts: individuals can request that a federal act which 
is not compatible with a right guaranteed in the ECHR does not apply.
34 dƣƣ ƣ.ƨ. BGE ᇳᇵᇹ I ᇵᇷᇳ.
35 dƣƣ ƣ.ƨ. BGE ᇳᇵᇸ I ᇸᇷ.
36 BGE ᇳᇴᇷ II ᇶᇳᇹ ᄬaKKᄭ; ƾƣƣ ƿƩƣ ơƩƞƻƿƣƽ ƺƹ Iƹƿƣƽƹƞƿiƺƹƞl cƣlƞƿiƺƹƾ, ƻ. ᇳᇹᇹ.
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The Federal Supreme Court is competent to review the compatibility of can-
tonal laws and decisions with the federal Constitution. Various causes célèb-
res of the Federal Supreme Court concerned such constellations and have 
led to the development of an impressive stream of case law on fundamental 
rights.37 Indirectly, this case law again influences the law- making process at 
the federal level; it becomes clearer to the Federal Assembly what the court 
will regard as constitutionally unacceptable.38 Moreover, it is possible to chal-
lenge decisions based on federal ordinances as to their alleged incompatibi-
lity with the federal Constitution and to request their annulment.
37 See pp. 159.
38 Hؔ؟؟ؘإ, n. 569.
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III. LƞƹƢƸƞƽk Cƞƾƣƾ
The Federal Supreme Court has been discussed throughout this chapter; it 
is the highest court in Switzerland. Although its powers are limited in scope 
by Article 190 Constitution, which precludes any possibility of constitutional 
review of federal acts, it takes an active role in protecting fundamental rights, 
as the following two cases demonstrate.
ᇳ. hآؠؘء’ئ dبؙؙإؘؚؔ
In 1989, e؛ؘإؘئؔ cآ؛ءؘإ requested that the cantonal authorities allow her 
to participate at the Landsgemeinde of the Canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden, 
in order to exercise her political rights. The cantonal authorities rejected her 
application, on the basis that Article 16 of the Constitution of the Canton of 
Appenzell Innerrhoden did not grant political rights to women; only men 
could vote and participate in elections. In 1990, the Landsgemeinde dealt 
with a proposal to change the cantonal Constitution, according to which the 
political rights would have been extended to all Swiss citizens residing in the 
ơƞƹƿƺƹèᅬ iƹơlǀƢiƹƨ ǂƺƸƣƹ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƿƩƣ LƞƹƢƾƨƣƸƣiƹƢƣ, ǂƩƺƾƣ ǁƺƿiƹƨ ƻƺƻǀ-
lation at this time consisted of men alone, rejected the proposal. Several appli-
cants, among them fإئب؟ؔ Bؔبؠؔءء and Mؔإ؜آ dآءؘؗإؘؘؚؚإ, challenged 
the decision of the Landsgemeinde. They requested that the Federal Supreme 
Court annul the decision and oblige the canton to introduce women’s suffrage.
Upon appeal, the Federal Supreme Court agreed with the arguments of the 
applicants.39 It determined that the exclusion of women from the cantonal elec-
torate violated Article 4 II of the federal Constitution of 1874, an article intro-
duced in 1981 providing for equal treatment of men and women (now: Article 
8 II Constitution). The Federal Supreme Court held that the principle of equal 
treatment also applied to political rights at the cantonal level. Thus, the cantonal 
practice which did not allow women to participate at the Landsgemeinde vio-
lated Article 4 II Constitution 1874. Although Article 74 IV Constitution of 1874 
39 BGE ᇳᇳᇸ Iƞ ᇵᇷᇻ.
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(now: Article 39 I Constitution) provided that it was up to the cantons to regu-
late the exercise of political rights at the cantonal level, this Article had no effect 
on the Federal Supreme Court’s decision because it did not explicitly provide for 
an exception from the principle of equal treatment. Consequently, the Canton 
of Appenzell Innerrhoden was required to allow women to participate at the 
Landsgemeinde and to exercise the political rights which were provided for in the 
cantonal law. The Federal Supreme Court concluded that it was possible to inter-
pret Article 16 of the Constitution of the Canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden to this 
effect; it was not necessary for the canton to formally change its Constitution.
The decision rendered by the Federal Supreme Court ended the long fight of 
Swiss women (supported by at least some men) for equal treatment regarding 
political rights. On the federal level, the women had already been granted full 
political rights in 1971, based on a constitutional revision approved of by a 
ƸƞjƺƽiƿǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƣƺƻlƣèᅬ ƹƞƸƣlǄ, ᇸᇷè% ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ƹƣƹ ǂƩƺ ƿǀƽƹƣƢ ǀƻ ƿƺ ǁƺƿƣèᅬ 
and a majority of the cantons (Article 74 I Constitution 1874, now: Article 136 
Constitution). The Canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden was the last canton to 
follow suit. Irritatingly and somewhat depressingly, the (male) electorate of 
the canton was not ready to introduce women’s suffrage itself. Rather, the 
Federal Supreme Court needed to step in.
ᇴ. Nؔابإؔ؟؜ئؔا؜آء ؔءؗ Fبءؗؔؠؘءاؔ؟ c؜ؚ؛ائ
In 2000, the electorate of the Commune of Emmen (Canton of Lucerne) was 
called upon to decide on 23 applications for naturalisation (comprising 56 for-
eign nationals, in some cases applying together as families) in a ballot vote. 
The people voted in favour of the naturalisation of only eight applicants, who 
were all Italian citizens. They rejected all other applications, which were 
ƸƞiƹlǄ ƾǀƟƸiƿƿƣƢ ƟǄ ơiƿiǅƣƹƾ ƺƤ ƣǃ- jǀƨƺƾlƞǁiƞƹ ơƺǀƹƿƽiƣƾ ᄬƾƺƸƣ ƺƤ ǂƩƺƸ ƩƞƢ 
been born in Switzerland and had always lived here). Four of these applicants 
challenged the negative vote. The cantonal government council, as the first 
appellate authority, rejected their complaints.
The Federal Supreme Court annulled the decision of the commune on 
appeal.40 It held that the electorate is a state organ and exercises a state fun-
ction when it decides on the naturalisation of foreign nationals and thus on 
their legal status. Therefore, the electorate is obliged to respect fundamental 
rights (Article 35 Constitution). In particular, the prohibition of discrimination 
40 BGE ᇳᇴᇻ I ᇴᇳᇹ.
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ƞƻƻliƣƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇺèII Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹᄭ. Oƹ ƿƩƣ Ɵƞƾiƾ ƺƤ Ʃƺǂ ƿƩƣ ƣlƣơƿƺƽƞƿƣ ƢƣơiƢƣƢèᅬ 
naturalisation of all Italian applicants, no naturalisation of all applicants from 
ƣǃ- jǀƨƺƾlƞǁiƞƹ ơƺǀƹƿƽiƣƾ ǂiƿƩƺǀƿ ƣǁiƢƣƹƿ ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ ƢiƤƤƣƽƣƹơƣƾ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ƿƩƣ 
ƞƻƻliơƞƹƿƾèᅬ ƞƹƢ ƻǀƟliơƞƿiƺƹƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƩƞƢ Ɵƣƣƹ ơiƽơǀlƞƿƣƢ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƽǀƹ- ǀƻ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ǁƺƿƣ 
(flyers and letters to newspapers calling out to reject the applications of per-
ƾƺƹƾ ƤƽƺƸ ƣǃ- jǀƨƺƾlƞǁiƞƹ ơƺǀƹƿƽiƣƾᄭ, ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƢƣơiƢƣƢ ƿƩƞƿ 
the constitutional prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of origin had 
been violated. Moreover, it held that the right to be heard applies; negative deci-
sions must be backed up with adequate reasoning (Article 29 II Constitution). 
This right to be heard is violated per se in cases in which the electorate deci-
des on naturalisation applications in a secret ballot vote, as here it is logically 
impossible to deliver a proper justification for a negative decision. As such, it is 
no longer permissible to decide on naturalisations through ballot voting. 
Most commentators have welcomed the Federal Supreme Court’s judg-
ment, and rightly so. In a series of later cases, the Federal Supreme Court has 
further clarified the guidelines. It acknowledged that decisions on the natu-
ralisation of foreign nationals may still be taken by the communal electorate 
if this is considered by the commune to be the appropriate forum; however, 
the decision- making process must respect fundamental rights. The most 
obvious rights which must be respected in such a process are the prohibition 
of discrimination (Article 8 II Constitution), the prohibition of arbitrariness 
(Article 9 Constitution), the right to privacy (Article 13 Constitution), the free-
dom of religion and conscience (Article 15 Constitution) and the right to be 
heard (Article 29 II Constitution).41 Today, a significant number of communal 
electorates retain the competence to decide on the naturalisation of foreign 
nationals; the figure has been estimated at approximately 800 communes.
Not everyone was satisfied with the Federal Supreme Court’s judgement: 
in 2008, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) tried to turn back the wheel. It col-
lected the necessary 100’000 signatures for a popular initiative entitled “for 
democratic naturalisations” (“für demokratische Einbürgerungen”) accor-
ding to which it would have been entirely up to the communes to decide on 
the decision- making process for naturalisations, thus allowing secret ballot 
voting to be reinstated. The people and the cantons overwhelmingly rejected 
the initiative (63 % voting against). Instead, the Federal Assembly codified 
the basic elements of the Federal Supreme Court’s case law in the Federal Act 
ƺƹ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CiƿiǅƣƹƾƩiƻ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾèᇳᇷᅬᇳᇹᄭ.
41 dƣƣ ƣ.ƨ. BGE ᇳᇴᇻ I ᇴᇵᇴ; BGE ᇳᇵᇲ I ᇳᇶᇲ; BEG ᇳᇵᇷ I ᇶᇻ; BGE ᇳᇵᇻ I ᇳᇸᇻ.
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